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{{Infobox Philosopher| region = Western Philosophy| color = #B0C4DE| image_name = | name = Saul Kripke| birth = | death =| school_tradition = [Analytic philosophy (particularly [Modal logic)Philosophy of language, [Bertrand Russell, Alfred Tarski, Ludwig Wittgenstein[Kripkenstein-->Saul Aaron Kripke (born in November 13, 1940 in Bay Shore, New York) is an United States philosophy and logician now emeritus from Princeton University and teaches as distinguished professor of philosophy at CUNY Graduate Center. He has been immensely influential in a number of fields related to logic and philosophy of language. Much of his work remains unpublished or exists only as tape-recordings and privately circulated manuscripts. Kripke was the winner of the 2001 Schock Prize in Logic and Philosophy.

Biography Saul Kripke is the eldest of three children born to Dorothy and Rabbi Myer Kripke. His father was the leader of Beth El Synagogue, the only Conservative congregation in Omaha, Nebraska. His mother wrote Jewish educational children's books. Saul and his two sisters, Madeline and Netta, attended Dundee Grade School in Omaha and Omaha Central High School. He wrote his first essay at the age of sixteen on the semantics of modal logics. Reportedly, he was invited to come work at Princeton University based on this essay. He replied: 'I'm honored by your proposal, but my mom says I have to finish high-school first.' After graduating from high school in 1958, Kripke attended Harvard University, earning a bachelor's degree in mathematics. During his wiktionary:sophomore year at Harvard, Kripke taught a graduate-level logic course at nearby MIT. For some years he taught at Harvard, moved to Rockefeller University in New York City in 1967, then to Cornell University in 1977, and finally became a professor at Princeton University. In 2002 Kripke started teaching at the CUNY Graduate Center in midtown Manhattan, and was appointed a distinguished professor of philosophy there in 2003. Kripke married (and subsequently divorced) the philosopher Margaret Gilbert. They have no children. He is a religious judaism.

Work Kripke is best known for four contributions to philosophy:

  • Kripke semantics for modal logic, published in several essays beginning while he was still in his teens.
  • His 1970 Princeton lectures Naming and Necessity (published in 1972 and 1980), that significantly restructured the philosophy of language and, as some have put it, "made metaphysics respectable again".
  • His interpretation of the philosophy of Wittgenstein.
  • His theory of truth.


    • Modal logic Two of Kripke's earlier works ("A Completeness Theorem in Modal Logic" - written while he was still a teenager - and "Semantical Considerations on Modal Logic") were on the subject of modal logic. The most familiar logics in the modal family are constructed from a weak logic called K, named after Kripke for his contributions to modal logic.

    In "Semantical Considerations on Modal Logic", published in 1963, Kripke responded to a difficulty with classical quantification theory. The motivation for the world-relative approach was to represent the possibility that objects in one world may fail to exist in another. If standard quantifier rules are used, however, every term must refer to something that exists in all the possible worlds. This seems incompatible with our ordinary practice of using terms to refer to things that exist contingently.

    Kripke's response to this difficulty was to eliminate terms. He gave an example of a system that uses the world-relative interpretation and preserves the classical rules. However, the costs are severe. First, his language is artificially impoverished, and second, the rules for the propositional modal logic must be weakened.

    Naming and necessity Kripke's three lectures constitute an attack on the descriptivist (Gottlob Frege, Bertrand Russell) theory of reference with respect to proper names, according to which a name refers to an object by virtue of the name's being associated with a description that the object in turn satisfies. He gave several examples purporting to render Descriptivist theory of names implausible (e.g., surely Aristotle could have died at age two and so not satisfied any of the descriptions we associate with his name, and yet it would seem wrong to deny that he was Aristotle). As an alternative, Kripke adumbrated a Causal theory of names, according to which a name refers to an object by virtue of a causal connection with the object as mediated through communities of speakers. In this way, a name is a rigid designation: it refers to the named object in every possible worlds in which the object exists. Causal theories of reference have also been elaborated and developed by Michael Devitt, Keith Donnellan, David Kaplan, Hilary Putnam, Nathan Salmon, Scott Soames, Gareth Evans, and others, and are perhaps more widely held than descriptivist theories now. Notable holdouts include John Searle, Richard Rorty, and Alonzo Church; also notable is the fact that Hilary Putnam has drawn back from such a completely causal account.

    Kripke also raised the prospect of a posteriori modality—facts that are necessarily true, though they can be known only through empirical investigation. Examples include “Hesperus is Phosphoros”, “Cicero is Tully”, “Water is H20” and other identity claims where two names refer to the same object.

    Finally, Kripke gave an argument against physicalism in the philosophy of mind, the view that every mental fact is identical with some physical fact (See talk). Kripke argued that the only way to defend this identity is as an a posteriori necessary identity, but that such an identity—e.g., pain is C fiber firing—could not be necessary, given the possibility of pain that has nothing to do with C-fibers firing. Similar arguments have been proposed by David Chalmers.

    Kripke delivered the John Locke lectures in philosophy at Oxford in 1973. Titled Reference and Existence, they are in many respects a continuation of Naming and Necessity, and deal with the subjects of fictional names and perceptual error. They have never been published and the transcript is officially available only in a reading copy in the university philosophy library, which cannot be copied or cited without Kripke's permission. In fact many copies are informally circulated among philosophers. Its influence, though considerable, is thus difficult to trace. However, it has been extensively referred to by some philosophers, particularly Gareth Evans (philosopher) and Nathan Salmon.

    Accusations of plagiarism In a 1995 paper, philosopher Quentin Smith argued that key concepts in Kripke's New Theory of Reference had originated from the work of Ruth Barcan Marcus more than a decade earlier. Smith identified six significant ideas to the New Theory which he claimed that Marcus had developed:



    Smith proceeded to argue that Kripke failed to understand Marcus' theory at the time, yet later adopted many of its key conceptual themes in his New Theory of Reference.

    Several scholars have subsequently offered detailed responses arguing that no plagiarism occurred..

    Wittgenstein Kripke also contributed to the study of the later Ludwig Wittgenstein in lectures published as Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language, although his work here has been faulted for misrepresenting the historical Wittgenstein. Indeed, many philosophers refer to the subject of Kripke's book as "Kripkenstein," on the grounds that the argument it presents would not have been endorsed by Wittgenstein. (For alternative readings of Wittgenstein, see Colin McGinn's Wittgenstein on Meaning.) The real significance of "Kripkenstein" was to put forward a clear statement of a new kind of scepticism, dubbed "meaning scepticism", which is the idea that for an isolated individual there is no fact in virtue of which a word has its meaning. Kripke's "sceptical solution" to meaning scepticism is to ground meaning in the behaviour of a community. Kripke's book generated a large secondary literature, divided between those who find his sceptical problem interesting and perceptive, and others (such as Gordon Baker and Peter Hacker) who argue that his meaning scepticism is a pseudo-problem that stems from a confused, selective reading of Wittgenstein.

    Truth In his 1975 article "Outline of a Theory of Truth", Kripke showed that a language can consistently contain its own truth predicate, which was deemed impossible by Alfred Tarski, a pioneer in the area of formal theories of truth. The trick involves letting truth be a partially defined property over the set of grammatically well-formed sentences in the language. Kripke showed how to do this recursively by starting from the set of expressions in a language which do not contain the truth predicate, defining a truth predicate over just that segment: this adds new sentences to the language, and truth is in turn defined for all of them. Unlike Tarski's approach, however, Kripke's lets "truth" be the union of all of these definition-stages; after a denumerable infinity of steps the language reaches a "fixed point" such that using Kripke's method to expand the truth-predicate does not change the language any further. Such a fixed point can then be taken as the basic form of a natural language containing its own truth predicate. But this predicate is undefined for any sentences that do not, so to speak, "bottom out" in simpler sentences not containing a truth predicate. That is, "'Snow is white' is true" is well-defined, as is "'"Snow is white" is true' is true," and so forth, but neither "This sentence is true" nor "This sentence is not true" receive truth-conditions; they are, in Kripke's terms, "ungrounded."

    Meaning of "I" In late January 2006, Kripke attended a conference celebrating his 65th birthday and work at the Graduate Center of the City University of New York, and delivered a 70-minute talk on "The First Person", discussing the meaning and reference of the pronoun "I". (New York Times, January 28, 2006). See external links.

    Notable publications by Kripke

    Literature about Kripke

    References External links

    {{Infobox Philosopher| region = Western Philosophy| color = #B0C4DE| image_name = | name = Saul Kripke| birth = | death =| school_tradition = [Analytic philosophy (particularly [Modal logic)Philosophy of language, [Bertrand Russell, Alfred Tarski, Ludwig Wittgenstein[Kripkenstein-->Saul Aaron Kripke (born in November 13, 1940 in Bay Shore, New York) is an United States philosophy and logician now emeritus from Princeton University and teaches as distinguished professor of philosophy at CUNY Graduate Center. He has been immensely influential in a number of fields related to logic and philosophy of language. Much of his work remains unpublished or exists only as tape-recordings and privately circulated manuscripts. Kripke was the winner of the 2001 Schock Prize in Logic and Philosophy.

    Biography Saul Kripke is the eldest of three children born to Dorothy and Rabbi Myer Kripke. His father was the leader of Beth El Synagogue, the only Conservative congregation in Omaha, Nebraska. His mother wrote Jewish educational children's books. Saul and his two sisters, Madeline and Netta, attended Dundee Grade School in Omaha and Omaha Central High School. He wrote his first essay at the age of sixteen on the semantics of modal logics. Reportedly, he was invited to come work at Princeton University based on this essay. He replied: 'I'm honored by your proposal, but my mom says I have to finish high-school first.' After graduating from high school in 1958, Kripke attended Harvard University, earning a bachelor's degree in mathematics. During his wiktionary:sophomore year at Harvard, Kripke taught a graduate-level logic course at nearby MIT. For some years he taught at Harvard, moved to Rockefeller University in New York City in 1967, then to Cornell University in 1977, and finally became a professor at Princeton University. In 2002 Kripke started teaching at the CUNY Graduate Center in midtown Manhattan, and was appointed a distinguished professor of philosophy there in 2003. Kripke married (and subsequently divorced) the philosopher Margaret Gilbert. They have no children. He is a religious judaism.

    Work Kripke is best known for four contributions to philosophy:

  • Kripke semantics for modal logic, published in several essays beginning while he was still in his teens.
  • His 1970 Princeton lectures Naming and Necessity (published in 1972 and 1980), that significantly restructured the philosophy of language and, as some have put it, "made metaphysics respectable again".
  • His interpretation of the philosophy of Wittgenstein.
  • His theory of truth.


    • Modal logic Two of Kripke's earlier works ("A Completeness Theorem in Modal Logic" - written while he was still a teenager - and "Semantical Considerations on Modal Logic") were on the subject of modal logic. The most familiar logics in the modal family are constructed from a weak logic called K, named after Kripke for his contributions to modal logic.

    In "Semantical Considerations on Modal Logic", published in 1963, Kripke responded to a difficulty with classical quantification theory. The motivation for the world-relative approach was to represent the possibility that objects in one world may fail to exist in another. If standard quantifier rules are used, however, every term must refer to something that exists in all the possible worlds. This seems incompatible with our ordinary practice of using terms to refer to things that exist contingently.

    Kripke's response to this difficulty was to eliminate terms. He gave an example of a system that uses the world-relative interpretation and preserves the classical rules. However, the costs are severe. First, his language is artificially impoverished, and second, the rules for the propositional modal logic must be weakened.

    Naming and necessity Kripke's three lectures constitute an attack on the descriptivist (Gottlob Frege, Bertrand Russell) theory of reference with respect to proper names, according to which a name refers to an object by virtue of the name's being associated with a description that the object in turn satisfies. He gave several examples purporting to render Descriptivist theory of names implausible (e.g., surely Aristotle could have died at age two and so not satisfied any of the descriptions we associate with his name, and yet it would seem wrong to deny that he was Aristotle). As an alternative, Kripke adumbrated a Causal theory of names, according to which a name refers to an object by virtue of a causal connection with the object as mediated through communities of speakers. In this way, a name is a rigid designation: it refers to the named object in every possible worlds in which the object exists. Causal theories of reference have also been elaborated and developed by Michael Devitt, Keith Donnellan, David Kaplan, Hilary Putnam, Nathan Salmon, Scott Soames, Gareth Evans, and others, and are perhaps more widely held than descriptivist theories now. Notable holdouts include John Searle, Richard Rorty, and Alonzo Church; also notable is the fact that Hilary Putnam has drawn back from such a completely causal account.

    Kripke also raised the prospect of a posteriori modality—facts that are necessarily true, though they can be known only through empirical investigation. Examples include “Hesperus is Phosphoros”, “Cicero is Tully”, “Water is H20” and other identity claims where two names refer to the same object.

    Finally, Kripke gave an argument against physicalism in the philosophy of mind, the view that every mental fact is identical with some physical fact (See talk). Kripke argued that the only way to defend this identity is as an a posteriori necessary identity, but that such an identity—e.g., pain is C fiber firing—could not be necessary, given the possibility of pain that has nothing to do with C-fibers firing. Similar arguments have been proposed by David Chalmers.

    Kripke delivered the John Locke lectures in philosophy at Oxford in 1973. Titled Reference and Existence, they are in many respects a continuation of Naming and Necessity, and deal with the subjects of fictional names and perceptual error. They have never been published and the transcript is officially available only in a reading copy in the university philosophy library, which cannot be copied or cited without Kripke's permission. In fact many copies are informally circulated among philosophers. Its influence, though considerable, is thus difficult to trace. However, it has been extensively referred to by some philosophers, particularly Gareth Evans (philosopher) and Nathan Salmon.

    Accusations of plagiarism In a 1995 paper, philosopher Quentin Smith argued that key concepts in Kripke's New Theory of Reference had originated from the work of Ruth Barcan Marcus more than a decade earlier. Smith identified six significant ideas to the New Theory which he claimed that Marcus had developed:



    Smith proceeded to argue that Kripke failed to understand Marcus' theory at the time, yet later adopted many of its key conceptual themes in his New Theory of Reference.

    Several scholars have subsequently offered detailed responses arguing that no plagiarism occurred..

    Wittgenstein Kripke also contributed to the study of the later Ludwig Wittgenstein in lectures published as Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language, although his work here has been faulted for misrepresenting the historical Wittgenstein. Indeed, many philosophers refer to the subject of Kripke's book as "Kripkenstein," on the grounds that the argument it presents would not have been endorsed by Wittgenstein. (For alternative readings of Wittgenstein, see Colin McGinn's Wittgenstein on Meaning.) The real significance of "Kripkenstein" was to put forward a clear statement of a new kind of scepticism, dubbed "meaning scepticism", which is the idea that for an isolated individual there is no fact in virtue of which a word has its meaning. Kripke's "sceptical solution" to meaning scepticism is to ground meaning in the behaviour of a community. Kripke's book generated a large secondary literature, divided between those who find his sceptical problem interesting and perceptive, and others (such as Gordon Baker and Peter Hacker) who argue that his meaning scepticism is a pseudo-problem that stems from a confused, selective reading of Wittgenstein.

    Truth In his 1975 article "Outline of a Theory of Truth", Kripke showed that a language can consistently contain its own truth predicate, which was deemed impossible by Alfred Tarski, a pioneer in the area of formal theories of truth. The trick involves letting truth be a partially defined property over the set of grammatically well-formed sentences in the language. Kripke showed how to do this recursively by starting from the set of expressions in a language which do not contain the truth predicate, defining a truth predicate over just that segment: this adds new sentences to the language, and truth is in turn defined for all of them. Unlike Tarski's approach, however, Kripke's lets "truth" be the union of all of these definition-stages; after a denumerable infinity of steps the language reaches a "fixed point" such that using Kripke's method to expand the truth-predicate does not change the language any further. Such a fixed point can then be taken as the basic form of a natural language containing its own truth predicate. But this predicate is undefined for any sentences that do not, so to speak, "bottom out" in simpler sentences not containing a truth predicate. That is, "'Snow is white' is true" is well-defined, as is "'"Snow is white" is true' is true," and so forth, but neither "This sentence is true" nor "This sentence is not true" receive truth-conditions; they are, in Kripke's terms, "ungrounded."

    Meaning of "I" In late January 2006, Kripke attended a conference celebrating his 65th birthday and work at the Graduate Center of the City University of New York, and delivered a 70-minute talk on "The First Person", discussing the meaning and reference of the pronoun "I". (New York Times, January 28, 2006). See external links.

    Notable publications by Kripke

    Literature about Kripke

    References External links



    Saul Kripke - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
    Saul Aaron Kripke (born in November 13, 1940 in Bay Shore, New York) is an American philosopher and logician, now emeritus from Princeton. He teaches as distinguished professor of ...

    Saul Kripke, Genius Logician
    Character sketch by Andreas Saugstad. Includes a picture and excerpts from the author's interview with Kripke.

    Philosophy Now
    Much later, in 1972, the Standard Metre was also useful to the American logician Saul Kripke. He turned to it in his book Naming and Necessity to help him show why no previous ...

    Saul Kripke - Wikiquote
    edit] Sourced. It really is a nice theory. The only defect I think it has is probably common to all philosophical theories. It's wrong. Naming and Necessity (1980, p. 64)

    Faculty: Saul Kripke | CUNY Graduate Center Philosophy Program
    Naming and Necessity. In D. Davidson and Harman, eds., Semantics of Natural Language. Dordrecht: Reidel, 253-355 and 763-769. (1972) Also Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass ...

    Saul Kripke at Erratic Impact's Philosophy Research Base
    Saul Kripke. Analytic Philosophy at Erratic Impact -- Philosophy Research Base. These pages present online resources in analytic philosophy, logical positivism, logic, philosophy ...

    The Graduate Center, CUNY
    Distinguished Professor, Ph.D. Program in Philosophy. Saul Kripke is known as a brilliant logician and one of the most important philosophers of the twentieth century.

    GSETVista
    alt="Your browser understands the tag but isn't running the applet, for some reason." Your browser is completely ignoring the tag!

    Kripke, Saul definition of Kripke, Saul in the Free Online ...
    Kripke, Saul (born Nov. 13, 1940, Bay Shore, Long Island, N.Y., U.S.) U.S. logician and philosopher. He taught at Rockefeller University (1968–76), Princeton University (1976 ...

    Philosophical Dictionary: Kindi-Kuhn
    Kripke, Saul Aaron (1940- ) American logician and philosopher. His early work, "A Completeness Theorem in Modal Logic" (1959) and "Semantical Considerations on Modal Logic (1963 ...

     

    Saul Kripke



     
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